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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine bond characteristics, bond pricing and 
risks related to bonds. In addition, this study focuses on how credit rating 
announcements affect sovereign bond returns in Europe. First, we cover bond 
markets and the role of credit rating agencies in general. After that, the 
above-mentioned topics are combined, and the effect of negative and positive 
credit rating information on bond returns is analyzed. The effect of rating 
changes is examined by measuring abnormal returns over the period from 
January 2000 to April 2015. 
 
On the grounds of total market value, bonds are by far the most significant 
asset class. It is worth mentioning that when global bond markets reached and 
exceeded an estimated $100 trillion milestone in 2013, the total value of stock 
markets was approximately three-fifths of the total value of the bond markets. 
Credit rating agencies play a major role in this vast bond market and have a 
substantial amount of power. Due to their role in financial markets and 
recurrent failures, it appears that arguments against credit rating agencies are 
partly justified. 
 
To summarize, the empirical findings of this paper support the view that rating 
changes from investment to non-investment grade cause significant market 
responses. Furthermore, the results suggest that negative rating changes within 
speculative grade are associated with more pronounced price reactions than 
downgrades in general. Although downgrades appear to be insignificant rating 
events, findings based on a small sample indicate that positive credit rating 
announcements do have an impact on sovereign bond returns. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
KEYWORDS: Sovereign bonds, bond pricing, credit rating, credit rating 
agencies, watchlist, outlook
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although stocks usually tend to dominate the conversation, bonds dominate 
the markets in value. Rates of government bonds and changes in credit ratings 
are now closely monitored and topics of daily news. The relationship between 
rating announcements and asset prices has been studied comprehensively. 
However, the effect of rating information on bonds has been largely neglected 
in Europe for some time. During the past few years, sovereign bond markets 
have also been quite volatile, especially in Europe. Thus, the paper will be 
about credit rating announcements and sovereign bonds. Because of the current 
economic situation, the topic in question is extremely timely. As we all know, 
several European countries are struggling with their debt burdens. 
 
Although credit rating agencies provide useful information, the current 
economic situation has sparked a lot of conversation about and criticism of 
credit rating agencies. This is, of course, completely natural given the role of 
credit rating agencies in the economy. Credit rating announcements affect bond 
prices, whereas bond prices affect corporations and sovereign entities. 
Therefore, credit rating agencies are extremely influential institutions. 
Moreover, recommendations made by the Basel Committee have increased 
further the use of credit ratings in international markets (Hooper, Hume & Kim 
2008: 142–143). The credit rating industry has been described as follows 
(Friedman 1996): 
 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's 
the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The 
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's can 
destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not 
clear sometimes who's more powerful.“ 
 
Credit rating agencies provide statements about the creditworthiness of entities. 
These agencies not only publish simple ratings but announce watchlists and 
outlooks as well. In other words, credit rating announcements help to assess 
credit risks. The higher the default or credit risk, the higher the probability that 
a borrower is unable to meet its obligations. It is rather difficult and time-
consuming to determine default risks. Therefore, credit rating agencies, such as 
Fitch Ratings, Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's Financial 
Services, offer valuable information. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011: 489.) 
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The use of credit ratings is not new in itself. The first announcements were 
published already in 1909 (White 2010: 211). As the markets have changed, both 
the importance of credit rating information and the role of credit rating agencies 
have also changed profoundly. Nowadays, the rating market is dominated by 
the three largest agencies, commonly referred to as the Big Three. Credit rating 
information is, of course, vital to financial markets, but the importance of credit 
rating agencies has also a downside. 
 
Although there were several reasons for the recent financial crisis, it is difficult 
to dispute the unfavorable effects of the over-optimistic credit ratings that 
fueled the crisis. As we all know, after housing prices plunged in the United 
States, it became apparent that credit ratings for mortgage-backed securities 
were not as accurate as though. This, in turn, contributed to the collapse of the 
housing market in 2006, which eventually resulted in a full-scale and global 
financial crisis. (White 2010: 212.) 
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
This study examines the effects of credit rating information on sovereign bond 
prices in Europe. In other words, the purpose of the study is to determine 
whether upgrades and downgrades affect government bond prices. Based on 
previous studies, it would be quite logical to expect that downgrades cause 
significant price reactions, while upgrades lead to less significant reactions. In 
addition, the aim of this paper is to examine whether differences in maturities 
matter. The study also explores announcement anticipation and differences 
between investment-grade and speculative-grade bond price reactions. 
 
This study makes an important contribution to the existing literature by 
examining European bond markets during the financial crisis. The paper is also 
about information efficiency and frictionless markets. In efficient markets, 
announcements should, of course, lead to price changes in assets related to the 
announcements. The chosen time period combined with European bond market 
data provides an ideal and intriguing setting for the study. Findings related to 
information and market efficiency are always valuable information to investors. 
Although the results of the study may not be groundbreaking, each and every 
paper forms a valuable link in the chain of studies. 
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1.2. Research Hypotheses 
The research hypotheses revolve around the topics of information asymmetry, 
investment-grade barrier and anticipation of credit rating announcements. 
Based on previous studies, it seems that credit rating downgrades lead to 
significant price reactions. However, results of the studies are not consistent on 
whether credit rating upgrades significantly affect bond prices. Therefore, the 
first research hypothesis must be as follows: 
 
H1 : Credit rating downgrades cause significant bond prices reactions, 
whereas upgrades do not cause significant market responses. 
 
Some studies suggest that drop to speculative-grade category forces investors 
with a mandate to hold only investment-grade bonds to liquidate the assets. In 
other words, drop below investment grade may lead to pronounced price 
reactions, commonly referred to as cliff effects. Moreover, it appears that 
speculative-grade bonds are in general more prone to significant price reactions 
than investment-grade bonds. Based on the above-mentioned findings, the 
following hypothesis is formed: 
 
H2 : Downgrades from investment to non-investment grade affect bond 
prices, while opposite upgrades do not cause significant price effects. 
 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) provided evidence that prior rating is a key driver of 
stock price reactions. Based on the study, this crucial variable has been omitted 
in many studies. In order to examine whether prior ratings affect bond price 
reactions, the following is hypothesized: 
 
H3 : Lower prior ratings lead to larger bond price reactions, and higher 
prior ratings are associated with less significant price effects. 
1.3. Structure of the Study 
The first chapters form the theoretical part of the study. As usual, the first 
chapter is an introductory chapter, which is followed by the chapters exploring 
the bond market and bond pricing theory. After the aforementioned topics, 
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rating services and criticism of credit rating agencies are covered in the fourth 
chapter. The empirical part of the paper begins with a literature review of 
relevant studies, after which the data and methodology are presented in the 
following chapter. The empirical results are presented in the penultimate 
chapter, while the last chapter concludes the paper. 
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2. BOND CHARACTERISTICS 
Historically, bonds have been and are even today an extremely important form 
of investment. Based on the total market value, bonds are also by far the largest 
asset class. For example, when the global bond market exceeded an estimated 
$100 trillion in 2013, the total value of the stock market was approximately 
three-fifths of the global bond market capitalization (Bank for International 
Settlements 2014; The World Bank 2017). This again is due to the fact that 
institutional investors, such as pension and insurance companies, value bonds 
for steady yields and relatively low risk. Governments, states, municipalities, 
banks and companies are the most common bond issuers. The United States, 
Japan and Germany are a few of the largest issuers worldwide, with the United 
States being undisputedly the largest. In addition, public lending institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the European Investment Bank, are large bond 
issuers (Anderson 1998: 98-99). 
 
During the past few decades, the importance of securitization has grown in the 
bond markets. Securitization refers to, for example, a situation in which a 
number of loans will be collected together as collateral for sold securities, such 
as bonds. The principal will be paid back to investors with interests from 
payments made by debtors. In other words, the loans are converted into 
secondary market securities. These securities are referred to as asset-backed 
securities (ABS). In the absence of alternative funding sources, this can be a 
reasonable solution for a debtor. The bonds in question have usually a high 
rating and the effective yield is higher than the yield on government debt 
securities. Securitized assets are often sold to large institutional investors in 
over-the-counter markets. (Anderson 1998: 99, 115; Blake 2000: 379.) 
 
The importance of junk bonds has also grown. The term junk bond refers to a 
bond which has an extremely low rating but a high rate of return. Markets 
consider bonds rated below BBB- by S&P as junk bonds, while Moody's rates 
junk bonds below Baa3. Despite the negative connotation, these bonds are a 
crucial part of the debt market. It is an important form of financing for 
organizations whose financial condition is weak. Such an organization can be, 
for example, a company which is recently founded. However, risk awareness is 
of the utmost importance in the case of junk bonds. Thus, junk bonds can be 
part of a well-diversified portfolio. (Anderson 1998: 99–114.) 
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2.1. Bond Markets 
Bonds are financial instruments that are used for raising funds for a number of 
different purposes. Among other things, longer maturity distinguishes the 
bonds from money market instruments. Another major difference is the fact 
that bonds are generally not discount securities, which means that the creditor 
receives interest payments on a regular basis. Bonds can be divided into, for 
example, debenture, subordinated debt, government and corporate bonds. 
Debentures are riskier and therefore differ significantly from other bonds.  In 
the event of bankruptcy, the holders of bonds and other loans take precedent 
over the holders of debentures. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 106; 
Martikainen & Martikainen 2009: 62.) 
 
When investing in a bond, a buyer or creditor loans the principal to a debtor. In 
turn, the issuer undertakes to pay interest payments and repayments to the 
debtholder according to the terms of the contract. The annual interest rate that 
the issuer agrees to pay is also referred to as the coupon rate, or simply coupon. 
Repaid capital is equal to the nominal value of the bond. The principal of the 
loan can be repaid either in a single payment at the end of the loan period or in 
several payments during the lifespan of the security. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 107; 
Martikainen & Martikainen 2009: 63.) 
 
The nominal value, or face value, is not necessarily equal to the market price of 
a bond. The price of a bond is mainly affected by changes in credit ratings and 
by the prevailing level of interest rates at the time. While the face value remains 
unchanged, the bond might be traded below or above par in the bond market. 
To be precise, the final bond price consists of the market price and possible 
accrued interest. If the bond is traded after the coupon payment date, the seller 
is entitled to the interest that has accrued before the sale. Like securitized assets, 
most bonds are also traded over-the-counter. (Thau 2001; Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus 2002.) 
 
The coupon rate is calculated on the par value of a bond, whereas the current 
yield refers to the annual return that the investor will gain when the bond is 
bought from the secondary market at the current price. The rate of a bond can 
be either fixed or it can be tied to, for example, market rates. In most cases, 
however, bonds are fixed-rate coupon bonds. The coupon rate on the fixed-rate 
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bond remains the same for the entire lifespan of the security, while floating 
coupon rate fluctuates and adjusts to changes. In addition, there are bonds that 
do not pay coupon payments at all. For example, zero-coupon bonds are 
discount securities issued without coupon payments. The profit of a zero-
coupon bond consists of the difference between the purchase and selling price. 
(Martikainen & Martikainen 2009: 63, 102.) 
 
Bonds also offer a variety of different features and additional benefits, such as 
repurchase or redeem rights. From the issuer's point of view, redeemable or 
callable bonds can be quite useful debt instruments. If interest rates drop, the 
issuer may redeem its bonds and reissue new bonds at a lower rate. In contrast, 
a puttable bond usually benefits the owner of the bond. Bond yields can also be 
bound to a variety of factors. Walt Disney, for example, has tied coupon 
payments to the economic success of its films, whereas the repayment of a bond 
issued by Electrolux has been dependent on the possibility of earthquakes in 
Japan. (Bodie et al. 2002: 425–426, 428.) 
2.2. Mezzanine Financing and Indexed Bonds 
Mezzanine financing has the financial characteristics of both debt and equity 
financing. Mezzanine financing is often used, for example, in the case of 
acquisition or restructuring. The form of financing in question is usually offered 
by banks, financial institutions and venture capitalists. A few of the most 
common forms of mezzanine financing are subordinated debt, convertible 
bonds and bonds with embedded options. Although mezzanine financing can 
take a variety of different forms, it often relates to bonds; therefore, it needs to 
be included in the study. In addition, the topic of indexed bonds is briefly 
explored in the chapter. (Martikainen & Martikainen 2009: 66.) 
 
Subordinated debt can be structured as a combination of debt and equity 
financing. Compared with senior debt, subordinated bonds have lower priority 
in regard to claims to assets in the event of bankruptcy or liquidation. In many 
cases, these bonds have no collateral and are therefore referred to as unsecured 
bonds. However, bondholders must be paid prior to shareholders. The issuer 
can be, for example, a newly established business or company in financial 
distress. (Anderson & Tuhkanen 2004; Martikainen & Martikainen 2009.) 
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Funds can also be raised by issuing hybrid securities, such as convertible bonds 
and bonds with embedded options. Convertible bonds can be converted into a 
number of shares of the issuing company as specified by the conversion ratio. 
The conversion ratio, which is stated in the bond indenture, determines the 
number of shares to which the bondholder is entitled. The coupon rate on a 
convertible bond is typically lower than the coupon rate on a nonconvertible 
bond as the holder of the convertible bond profits from an increase in the price 
of the underlying share. (Martikainen & Martikainen 2009; Bodie et al. 2011.) 
 
Convertible bonds and bonds with embedded options can be quite similar debt 
instruments. For example, the main difference between bonds with warrants 
and convertible bonds is that the warrants of the former are usually detachable. 
In other words, the bond as well as the warrant can be traded separately in the 
secondary market. This detachable warrant entitles an investor to subscribe to 
new shares of the issuer in accordance with the terms of the contract. These 
embedded options tend to decrease the coupon rate because investors may 
profit from the embedded security. The face value has to be repaid to the 
creditor regardless of whether new shares were subscribed or not. (Martikainen 
& Martikainen 2009: 66–68.) 
 
Coupons on an indexed bond are most often tied to a price, commodity or 
equity index. However, these floating-rate securities can be paired with a 
variety of different reference rates, as mentioned above. From the investor's 
point of view, it is beneficial that the real rate of return is known in advance. In 
addition, these bonds can be useful to institutional investors who are restricted 
from investing directly in stocks or commodities. After fixed-rate bond sector, 
index-linked bonds form the largest bond sector in the United Kingdom. Many 
of these bonds are adjusted to inflation. In the United States, equivalent 
government bonds are called Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and 
have been issued since 1997. (Anderson & Tuhkanen 2004: 192; Fabozzi 2007: 6.) 
2.3. Risks Associated with Bonds 
Government bonds in particular are often considered to be free of credit risk or 
even risk-free investments. However, several risks are associated with investing 
in sovereign bonds and bonds in general. As the United States government can 
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always raise taxes or increase the money supply to meet the interest payments, 
risk premium is not included in the yield on bonds issued by the government. 
Although securities issued by the United States government are treated as free 
of credit risk, uncertainties regarding the debt ceiling have affected Treasury 
security yields numerous times since the Clinton Administration. (Mishkin & 
Eakins 2003: 120–123.) 
 
A few of the most significant risks associated with bonds are interest rate risk, 
reinvestment risk, call risk, credit risk, inflation risk, currency risk, liquidity risk 
and volatility risk. Investors are also exposed to risks related to the yield curve 
shifts, taxation and unforeseen events. In addition to these risks, it is also a risk 
that the underlying risks are not completely perceived. This risk relates to the 
increased complexity of structured products and appears now more topical 
than ever. A few of the risks mentioned will be explored more closely in the 
next four sections of the paper. (Fabozzi 2000: 5–8, 151.) 
2.3.1. Interest Rate Risk 
As we all know, bond prices and the level of interest rates correlate negatively. 
As interest rates and bond yields rise, bond prices decrease in general. If an 
investor sells a bond before the maturity date, an increase in interest rates 
results in a market price lower than the purchase price. Market prices have to 
adjust to changes in interest rates as coupon payments usually remain fixed. 
Interest rate risk, also known as market risk, is unquestionable the most 
significant risk investor is exposed to in the bond market. As maturity is one of 
the major factors affecting price sensitivity to changes in interest rates, market 
risk tends to be higher for bonds with long maturities. (Fabozzi 2000: 6.) 
2.3.2. Reinvestment Risk 
When reinvesting cash flows, it is possible that the anticipated interest rate on 
the reinvestment is lower than the initial rate of return. This risk is referred to 
as reinvestment risk. Once again, the risk is greater for bonds with long 
maturities as reinvestment risk increases with maturity. While interest rate risk 
occurs as interest rates rise, reinvestment risk materializes when interest rates 
fall. The disparity between these risks enables an investment strategy referred 
to as immunization. (Fabozzi 2000: 6.) 
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2.3.3. Credit Risk 
In brief, credit risk has to do with the issuer's ability to meet its financial 
obligations. The risk can be categorized into three different types of risk: default 
risk, credit spread risk and downgrade risk. Credit risk is the risk that the issuer 
may lack sufficient financial resources for interest payments and repayment of 
principal. In addition to investors, credit risk is assessed on an ongoing basis by 
credit rating agencies. The effects of credit risk appear in the differences 
between Treasury bond yields and yields of comparable debt securities issued 
by other entities. This difference is also referred to as the credit spread. Aside 
from default risk, investors are most concerned about credit spread changes. 
Moreover, investors are exposed to downgrade risk as bond yields are affected 
by credit rating announcements. (Fabozzi 2000: 7.) 
2.3.4. Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk refers to the marketability of securities as well as to the difference 
between the quoted bid and ask prices. This spread tends to widen as liquidity 
risk increases and vice versa. Although the risk is insignificant for investors 
who hold debt securities until maturity, it hinders institutional investors from 
determining the fair value of assets as portfolio managers must periodically 
mark positions to market. For example, marking to market leads to unfavorable 
and inaccurate asset values in illiquid markets. (Fabozzi 2000: 8.) 
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3. BOND PRICING 
The fundamental valuation principles are the same for both stocks and bonds. 
However, bonds are usually fixed-income securities, and therefore future cash 
flows are known in advance. This, in turn, simplifies bond pricing substantially. 
The present value of a bond consists of the discounted value of coupon 
payments and principal, whereas the risk-free rate and the risk premium form 
the required rate of return. (Fabozzi, Modigliani & Ferri 1994: 3–4.) 
3.1. Price Determination 
The value of a bond, whose principal will be repaid at maturity, and which 
makes constant and periodical coupons, can be calculated in the following way 
(Nikkinen et al. 2002: 93, 113): 
 
(1)  P" = $%('())%+,-' + /0'() 1 
 
where: P0 = bond price 
 Ct = coupon payment 
 FV = face value 
 r = interest rate 
 T = term to maturity 
 t = time period 
 
When determining the value of a bond, the importance of the risk premium 
should be kept in mind. The required rate of return should, of course, increase 
with the associated risks. In other words, if the required yield rises above the 
coupon rate, the price of the bond falls below the par value and is said to be 
selling at a discount. In contrast, the bond is traded at a premium when the 
required yield is less than the coupon rate. When the required yield equals the 
coupon rate, the bond is trading at par. (Fabozzi 2000: 23–24.) 
 
In addition, changes in the current level of interest rates inversely affect bond 
prices as the relation between prices and yields is inverse. The required rate of 
return must, of course, adjust to changes in the general level of interest rates. 
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The equation above can also be used for calculating yield to maturity by placing 
the market price as the present value of future cash flows. Contrary to the 
nominal and current yield, the yield to maturity takes account of the market 
price, par value, term to maturity, coupon rate and, above all, reinvested 
coupon payments. In other words, it is the internal rate of return on an 
investment. (Bodie et al. 2002: 433–434.) 
3.2. Price Volatility 
The price sensitivity to interest rate changes and interest rate risk of an 
investment can be measured by determining the weighted average maturity of 
its future cash flows. This effective maturity is also referred to as Macaulay 
duration. The key determinants affecting duration are term to maturity, coupon 
rate and yield to maturity. All else equal, as coupon rate rises, duration usually 
tends to decrease. Furthermore, the longer the maturity, the greater the 
duration. Macaulay duration is calculated as follows (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 123): 
 
(2)  D = t×w6+,-'  
 
where: w6 = $/%/('())%8  
 
 T = term to maturity 
 CFt = cash flow at time t 
 r = yield to maturity 
 P = bond price 
 t = time period 
 
However, an adjusted version of the equation is commonly used for estimating 
the percentage change in price for a change in yield. The price sensitivity can be 
gauged using the following modified duration (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 124): 
 
(3)  ∆88 = −D∗×∆r 
 
where: D∗ = D/(1 + r) 
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Duration is a relatively accurate estimate of the effect of interest rates on bond 
prices if changes in bond yield are comparatively small. If interest rate changes 
are large, duration should be supplemented with an additional measure. The 
change in the price of a bond can be accurately calculated using the following 
equation (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 126): 
 
(4)  Convexity = '8×('())> $/%'() % (t? + t)+6-'  
 
  ∆88 = −D∗×∆r + '?×convexity×(∆r)?  
As previously stated, duration is merely an estimate of the relationship between 
interest rate changes and bond prices. Limitations of duration can be corrected 
by accounting for the curvature of the price-yield curve. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
the curve presenting the relation between price and yield is convex instead of 
linear. This curvature is referred to as convexity. (Thau 2011: 70.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Convexity and duration (Bodie et al. 2011: 547). 
3.3. Term Structure of Interest Rates 
As mentioned above, maturity affects bond yields. However, the relationship 
between yield to maturity and maturity varies substantially over time. This 
Pr
ice
 
Yield 
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relationship is referred to as the term structure of interest rates and is illustrated 
by the yield curve. Figure 2 shows a commonly observed shape of the yield 
curve. In addition to a rising or normal yield curve, yield curves can, for 
example, also be inverted or flat. The shape of the yield curve changes with 
economic growth expectations. Thus, an upward-sloping yield curve may 
indicate that investors are expecting high inflation and vice versa. Theories 
pertaining to shapes of the yield curve are explored briefly at the end of this 
chapter. (Bodie et al. 2011: 508–509.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Normal yield curve (Pilbeam 2010: 91). 
 
As the level of future interest rates is a major determinant of the shape of the 
yield curve, it is self-evident that investors require higher nominal rates when 
inflation is expected to rise. The impact of expected inflation on the level of real 
interest rates is known as the Fisher hypothesis. Based on the hypothesis, the 
real interest rate should equal the nominal interest rate minus the expected 
inflation. The relationship in question can be expressed in mathematical terms 
by the following Fisher equation (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 116–117): 
 
(5)  (1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + π) 
 
where: i = nominal interest rate 
 r = real interest rate 
 π = expected inflation 
Maturity 
Yi
eld
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There are several theories explaining the shape of the yield curve. These 
theories can be divided into two main categories: expectations theories and 
market segmentation theory. Expectations theories can be subdivided into pure 
expectations theory, liquidity preference theory and preferred habitat theory. 
Based on these three theories, forward rates implied by the yield curve indicate 
market expectations of future short-term rates. As the name suggests, the pure 
expectations theory relies purely on the predictive power of the forward rates. 
However, the theory does not account for maturity preferences, nor for risks 
inherent in investments. (Fabozzi 2007: 116, 118.) 
 
The liquidity preference theory and preferred habitat theory could be described 
as refined versions of the pure expectations theory. Based on these theories, the 
forward rates should not be considered as unbiased predictors of future interest 
rates. For example, the liquidity preference theory factors in a risk or liquidity 
premium and the term to maturity as the premium increases with maturity. The 
preferred habitat theory is a combination of expectations theories and market 
segmentation theory. Unlike the liquidity preference theory, it asserts that the 
premium does not necessarily rise uniformly with maturity. In other words, 
investors can be induced to move from a maturity range to another if 
compensation is considered adequate. In contrast, the market segmentation 
theory assumes that market participants are constrained to particular maturity 
sectors. (Fabozzi 2007: 119–120.) 
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4. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
As we all know, the information provided by credit rating agencies play a 
crucial role in financial markets. As the name implies, these organizations 
assess the creditworthiness of companies and sovereign entities. Throughout 
most of the twentieth century, credit rating agencies mainly scrutinized the 
creditworthiness of firms and sovereign entities. Today, however, credit rating 
agencies also analyze a wide variety of structured products on a regular basis. 
Although it is possible that investors are required to pay for rating information, 
in most cases the costs of services provided are covered by the issuer to 
facilitate the efficient use of rating information. (Bertocchi, Consigli, D'Ecclesia, 
Giacometti, Moriggia & Ortobelli 2013.) 
 
The credit rating market is dominated by the three largest credit rating 
agencies: Standard & Poor's Financial Services, Moody's Investors Service and 
Fitch Ratings. Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's are based in the United 
States, whereas Fitch Ratings is headquartered also in the United Kingdom. 
Fitch Ratings is owned by the French company Financière Marc de Lacharrière 
and by the American media company Hearst Communications, while Standard 
& Poor's is a subsidiary of S&P Global, formerly known as McGraw Hill 
Financial. The dominance of these companies is illustrated in Figure 3. It can be 
noted that the combined market share of the two largest rating agencies was 
83% in 2012. (Bertocchi et al. 2013.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Market shares of credit rating agencies (Bertocchi et al. 2013). 
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4.1. Rating Services 
It is fairly simple to rely on credit ratings rather than to comprehensively assess 
the creditworthiness of a particular issuer. Credit rating information discloses 
the probability of default and payment delays to investors in a concise form. At 
the beginning of the rating process, representatives of the credit rating agency 
usually meet with the issuer or customer. As the rating analysis proceeds, credit 
rating agencies examine present and forecast future cash flows. An increase in 
cash flow has, of course, a positive impact on the level of credit rating and vice 
versa. In addition, a high credit rating generally indicates that the amount of 
funds exceeds the amount of debt, while a large debt burden results in a 
speculative-grade rating. (Thau 2011.) 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings use 
somewhat different rating scales than Moody's. Furthermore, Standard & Poor's 
and Fitch Ratings use plus and minus signs to specify relative standing within 
the rating categories, whereas Moody's uses numbers from 1 to 3. For example, 
a rating of BB+ is equivalent to Ba1, while BB- is equivalent to Ba3. The credit 
rating scale is divided into investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings. All 
ratings below BBB- or Baa3 are considered speculative grade by market 
participants. Abbreviated definitions of credit ratings are also included in the 
table below. (Thau 2011.) 
 
Table 1. Definitions of credit ratings (Thau 2011: 33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Moody's Fitch Definition 
AAA Aaa AAA Highest quality 
AA Aa AA High quality 
A A A Good quality 
BBB Baa BBB Satisfactory 
BB Ba BB Speculative 
B B B Very speculative 
CCC Caa CCC Substantially speculative 
CC Ca CC Extremely speculative 
C C C In default 
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4.2. Conflict of Interest and Criticism 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the United States government appointed 
a committee to investigate the causes which led to the crisis. The conclusion of 
the final report drawn up by the committee mentioned that the three largest 
credit rating agencies were in a key role in the crisis. According to the report, 
this crisis would not have arisen without credit rating agencies. The committee 
selected Moody's for a more detailed examination. In 2006, Moody's gave the 
highest credit rating for 30 mortgage-related securities every day. Later on, a 
staggering 83% of these rated securities were downgraded. (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011: 25.) 
 
According to the commission, judgement was replaced by mathematical models 
and calculations in risk assessments conducted by financial institutions and 
credit rating agencies. Furthermore, the report emphasizes that the negative 
effects of securitization were known long before the crisis. As a result of 
securitization, high risk mortgages were repackaged as top-rated structured 
financial products. Even though this type of securitization seems questionable, 
it should be kept in mind that credit rating agencies were the institutions that 
rated these products. However, neither securitization nor rating agencies can be 
blamed solely for the crisis. (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011.) 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the multinational insurance corporation American 
International Group (AIG) had a credit rating of AA- by Standard & Poor's and 
Aa3 by Moody's. The insurance company was downgraded only after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Because of the high credit rating, the company 
was able to trade a wide variety of derivatives, such as credit default swaps, on 
a massive scale. However, credit default swaps insured against losses on 
collateralized debt obligations, which were in many cases backed by mortgages. 
As a consequence, AIG eventually received more than $170 billion from the 
Federal Reserve and Treasury (Mishkin 2010: 6). According to the commission, 
nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities were rated in the highest credit rating 
category from 2000 to 2007. It is also noteworthy that only six private sector 
companies in the United States had this most desired credit rating at the 
beginning of the decade. (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011: 25, 139–
140.) 
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Given the importance of credit rating agencies, it is not surprising that crises 
give rise to criticism of these institutions. The Asian and recent global financial 
crises as well as the Enron and WorldCom scandals have led to widespread 
criticism. For example, Enron's rating was downgraded below investment 
grade only a few days before the company declared bankruptcy. Enron and 
WorldCom scandals were also accounting scandals, but rating agencies have 
been wrong before and after these infamous instances. As we all know, Lehman 
Brothers collapsed almost unnoticed by rating agencies in September 2008. 
(White 2010.) 
 
Rating agencies have also been criticized for slowness in reacting to new 
information, but at the same time stable ratings are valued as constant changes 
force institutional investors to make adjustments to their portfolios. However, 
timely updates and stable ratings are usually conflicting objectives. It appears 
that the perception of inadequate timeliness is due to the through-the-cycle 
rating methodology that helps rating agencies to avoid rating reversals by 
ignoring short-term fluctuations. In other words, rating information does not 
fully reflect all available information. As investors favor stability at the expense 
of accuracy, the introduction of watchlist procedure has enabled rating agencies 
to provide precise information while maintaining ratings stable. (Altman & 
Rijken 2004; Löffler 2004.) 
 
In addition to rating timeliness, the relationship between rating agencies and 
issuers has been heavily criticized. In the 1970's, the largest rating agencies 
switched from a subscriber-pays to an issuer-pays model. The reason for the 
change is somewhat unclear even today. The technological development of 
photocopying may have contributed to it by making unauthorized use of rating 
information easier. It also possible that rating agencies realized that issuers 
needed their approval to maximize the marketability of bonds. On the other 
hand, it is quite common in information industries, such as the newspaper 
industry, that subscribers pay for information provided. (White 2010.) 
 
However, the current issuer-pays model is problematic as issuers are clients 
and under review at the same time. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, rating agencies were compensated only for ratings that were 
accepted by issuers. In other words, issuers were able to pressure rating 
agencies by threatening to turn to another agency. In addition to the external 
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pressure, agencies' eagerness to compete for market share undoubtedly affected 
the quality of rating information. It seems that rating agencies simply traded 
their reputation for satisfied clients and market share increases. (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011: 210–212.) 
 
It is estimated that there are as many as 150 credit rating agencies in the world, 
and the number of rating agencies appears to rise slowly (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2000: 14). However, as mentioned above, only a few 
dominate the credit rating market. Again, it is not surprising that this 
oligopolistic market structure has been widely criticized. White (2010: 217) 
mentions economies of scale, experience and reputation as potential barriers to 
entry. Due to the special characteristics of the credit rating industry, the market 
structure will remain oligopolistic also in the future. 
 
In addition to natural barriers to entry, there is the registration as a nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO). The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission classifies ten rating agencies as nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations (SEC 2017). Alp (2013) states that one of the 
objectives of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was to increase 
competition by facilitating the NRSRO registration. Nevertheless, it seems that 
criteria and review process for the designation still remain obscure (White 
2010). The current practice not only strengthens the oligopolistic market 
structure but also makes rating agencies license-granting NRSROs. Ratings are 
incorporated into laws and regulations, and only ratings by NRSROs matter. It 
appears that rating agencies sell regulatory licenses rather than concentrate on 
the informational value of ratings (Partnoy 1999: 621–624). 
 
After the financial crisis, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) as well as the 
European Union have amended guidelines and regulation concerning credit 
rating agencies. The main purpose of these reforms was to increase 
transparency and oversight. Although the credit rating industry has been 
regulated for decades, the regulation has been largely based on voluntary 
guidelines issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
Despite regulatory approach was opposed by the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR), Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies was passed in September 2009. (De Haan & Amtenbrink 2011: 17–20.) 
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As mentioned above, assessing risks related to structured financial products is 
challenging even for credit rating agencies. During the past years, rating 
agencies have repeatedly been overly optimistic about these securities. Due to 
structured products and miscalculations concerning these securities, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission was forced to revise the regulation 
concerning NRSROs in 2008 (Bertocchi et al. 2013: 122–123). According to De 
Haan and Amtenbrink (2011), increased requirements and regulation may 
actually strengthen confidence in credit rating agencies by giving the 
appearance that credit ratings are something more than opinions about 
creditworthiness. 
 
According to the Global Financial Stability Report (2008: 54) published by the 
International Monetary Fund, structured products can facilitate diversification, 
but at the same time these complex instruments add little value to the financial 
system. As noted above, shortcomings of the credit rating industry enabled the 
financial meltdown, but the crisis would not have occurred without structured 
products either. It appears that the underlying causes of the global financial 
crisis were systemic extending far beyond the failures of credit rating agencies. 
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5. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Katz (1974) was among the first to examine the relation between credit ratings 
and bonds and found that rating reclassifications of bonds issued by electric 
utility companies were not anticipated in the bond market during the period 
1966–1972. Later, however, Grier and Katz (1976) discovered that, unlike in the 
utility bond market, negative rating reclassifications were anticipated in the 
industrial bond market. In addition, the effects of reclassifications were more 
pronounced for industrial bonds than for bonds issued by utility companies. 
Both studies show that price adjustments to reclassifications can last up to three 
months, indicating that bond prices adjusted to new information rather slowly 
a few decades ago. 
 
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) likewise found that rating changes led 
to significant price reactions in the corporate bond market during the period 
1977–1982. It appears that announcements of downgrades affect bond prices 
more than positive credit rating information. Furthermore, price effects caused 
by downgrades are stronger for speculative-grade than for investment-grade 
bonds. However, the results of this paper are somewhat inconsistent. After 
eliminating simultaneous announcements, it seems that bond prices are affected 
only by positive credit rating information. Nevertheless, it is evident that credit 
rating announcements by Moody's and Standard & Poor's significantly affect 
corporate bond prices. 
 
According to Wansley, Glascock and Clauretie (1992), especially downgrades 
cause statistically significant market reactions. In addition, the results suggest 
that credit ratings crossing grades lead to stronger effects than ratings within 
grades. It seems to be unimportant for investors whether bond issues were 
placed on CreditWatch prior to rating announcements or not. Furthermore, the 
actual CreditWatch listings appear to be insignificant events. Consistent with 
conclusions of Grier and Katz (1976), the results indicate that industrial sector is 
more prone to price effects than utility companies. 
 
It appears that previous returns and the magnitude of rating changes are 
positively correlated with price effects. In addition, the results highlight the 
information asymmetry relating to credit rating announcements. It is somewhat 
unclear why negative rating information significantly affects bond prices, while 
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announcements of upgrades are insignificant events. One possible explanation 
is that institutional investors are constrained by, for example, prospectus to sell 
downgraded bonds. However, the results show that the effects of credit rating 
changes from investment grade to speculative grade are insignificant. Although 
previous studies have documented lags in adjustment, these results indicate 
that prices adjust within a week. Thus, it seems that the bond market is just as 
efficient as the equity market. (Wansley et al. 1992.) 
 
Instead of concentrating on the bond market, Goh and Ederington (1993, 1999) 
study the response of stock prices to rating changes. Goh and Ederington argue 
that credit rating announcements are not equal in regard to their information 
content. According to the studies, rating downgrades can be caused by either a 
deterioration of financial outlook or an increase in leverage. Based on the 
studies, credit rating announcements are in many cases anticipated by market 
participants as those are often preceded by, for example, changes in the capital 
structure. It appears that whether credit rating announcements have significant 
implications depends on the nature of these announcements. 
 
Rather than categorizing credit rating announcements based on causes, Cantor 
and Packer (1996) study the factors affecting the determination of sovereign 
credit ratings. They find that of the criteria used by Standard & Poor's and 
Moody's especially per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, 
economic development and default history are significant factors. They also 
stress that credit rating agencies compress the information of macroeconomic 
indicators into valuable sovereign credit ratings. Although it seems that credit 
rating agencies and market participants interpret new information similarly, the 
results indicate that rating announcements significantly affect credit spreads. 
 
Although the conclusions of Cantor and Packer (1996) are mostly consistent 
with previous studies on corporate bonds, they find that sovereign bonds rated 
below investment grade are more sensitive to credit rating announcements than 
investment-grade bonds. In addition to this, it appears that credit rating 
announcements that are fully anticipated cause larger price effects than 
unanticipated announcements. Their findings suggest that sovereign ratings 
contain more information than mere macroeconomic indicators as 92 percent of 
the sample variation is explained by credit ratings, but only 86 percent of the 
variation is explained by the macroeconomic variables. 
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Hite and Warga (1997) found that rating changes to and within speculative 
grade cause significant price reactions over the period beginning six months 
before and lasting until the end of the announcement month. In other words, 
the risk level and direction of the rating change appear to be the key elements 
affecting the magnitude of the price effect. For example, most of the effects 
caused by upgrades are insignificant, but rating changes from speculative grade 
to investment grade lead to positive abnormal returns. Unlike rating upgrades, 
announcements of downgrades have significant implications regardless of the 
level of the rating prior to the announcement. However, negative credit rating 
changes within investment grade lead to considerably weaker reactions than 
other downgrades. 
 
When the data sample is restricted to cover only events that are not preceded 
by rating actions over the six-month period prior to the announcement and in 
which Moody's and Standard & Poor's publish announcements simultaneously, 
the information disclosed by those agencies leads to even more pronounced 
price reactions. Hite and Warga (1997) state that the results obtained with this 
uncontaminated data confirm the perception that price reactions in the 
announcement month are due to the rating change and are not explained by 
previous rating actions. 
 
Based on a small subsample consisting of rating events that confirm the other 
agency's rating within six months, it appears that Moody's is able to provide 
more valuable information than Standard & Poor's. Rating changes by Moody's 
that confirm ratings by Standard & Poor's lead to stronger price reactions than 
in the opposite case. This holds true especially for negative ratings within 
speculative grade. As mentioned above, these observations are based on a very 
small subset and therefore merely provide a basis for further research. Overall, 
these rating agencies are equal in terms of the information they provide. (Hite 
and Warga 1997.) 
 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) found that announcements of downgrades have 
significant implications for dollar bond spreads on emerging market bonds. 
Furthermore, the results show that possible upgrades, also referred to as 
positive watchlistings, have strong effects on the bond spreads over the period 
from ten days before to a day after the announcement day. Contrary to the 
conclusions of Cantor and Packer (1996), the results show that, in general, the 
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effects of rating announcements on dollar bond spreads are not significant. In 
other words, it seems that only emerging market bonds are affected by the 
credit rating information provided by the three leading agencies. 
 
A study by Kliger and Sarig (2000) seeks to answer the question of why 
companies are willing to pay tens of thousands of dollars for credit ratings, 
although their bonds are rated regardless of whether they pay for the services 
or not. It appears that 98 percent of the issuers pay for their credit ratings. This 
may be due to privately disclosed forecasts, statements and internal reports. As 
clients, firms are able to provide rating agencies with valuable information 
without revealing it to, for example, competitors. Thus, credit rating agencies 
are able to incorporate this information into the ratings. If this theory holds, 
rating announcements should convey valuable information to the market. 
 
Moody's refined its credit rating classification on April 26, 1982. The study by 
Kliger and Sarig (2000) is based on an examination of asset prices around that 
day as it enables to evaluate the information value of ratings. All bonds 
followed by Moody's were rerated regardless of the fact that their 
creditworthiness remained unchanged. According to the paper, credit rating 
announcements do have an impact on yield spreads and bond prices. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that highly leveraged firms are more prone to 
rerating effects than less leveraged companies. 
 
Although several studies have focused on bonds and the bond market, few of 
those studies examine the relationship between credit rating announcements 
and bond prices in Europe. According to Steiner and Heinke (2001), the effects 
of credit rating information on bond prices in Europe have been neglected 
completely for some time. They state that it is still somewhat unclear to what 
extent ratings by agencies based in the United States are relied upon in the 
European markets. Due to country-specific differences the information value of 
these ratings may not be the same as in the United States. 
 
Furthermore, they discovered that negative rating announcements, including 
both downgrades and negative watchlistings, are associated with strong price 
reactions, whereas positive rating announcements do not cause significant price 
reactions. These results also suggest that the nationality of the issuer has a 
significant effect on the magnitude of the price reaction as price reactions are 
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stronger for issuers based in the United States. In addition, it appears that 
negative rating announcements lead to overreaction. In other words, negative 
abnormal returns are reversed by positive abnormal returns approximately 
three weeks after the announcement day, and the price level eventually rises 
above the price prior to the announcement day. (Steiner & Heinke 2001.) 
 
However, the results of Steiner and Heinke (2001) show that, instead of credit 
rating announcements, negative abnormal returns may be partly explained by 
investment restrictions. As mentioned above, it is possible that institutional 
investors are restricted to specific rating categories and thus may be forced to 
sell downgraded bonds. Consistent with the conclusions of Wansley et al. 
(1992) and Hite and Warga (1997), the results show that downgrades crossing 
the border between investment grade and speculative grade cause significant 
price reactions. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, significant price movements occur in the German 
bond market not only on the announcement day and after it but also during the 
three months preceding the announcement. In other words, rating agencies lag 
behind the market, since changes in credit risk are incorporated into prices 
prior to the announcement day. Furthermore, cumulative abnormal returns 
(CDAR) show the overreaction on and immediately after the announcement 
date followed by positive returns approximately two to three weeks after the 
announcement. However, it is unclear whether this is simply overreaction or 
due to the above-mentioned investment restrictions. Negative watchlistings 
also cause similar and significant abnormal returns, albeit not as high as caused 
by downgrades. (Steiner & Heinke 2001.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Negative abnormal bond returns (Steiner & Heinke 2001: 145). 
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Contrary to negative credit rating information, announcements of positive 
rating changes and positive watchlistings do not cause significant price 
reactions on or after the announcement day. Figure 5, however, shows that 
these rating actions tend to lag behind the market response to risk changes. 
Another possible explanation for this information asymmetry is that rating 
agencies estimate creditworthiness to be worse than in reality rather than the 
other way around. Overly optimistic views are usually more damaging than 
excessively pessimistic opinions. In other words, rating agencies protect their 
reputation by being overly cautious in their ratings. (Steiner & Heinke 2001.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Positive abnormal bond returns (Steiner & Heinke 2001: 146). 
 
Since credit default swaps are derivatives insuring against a default, also 
referred to as a credit event, these contracts also enable an examination of the 
effects caused by credit rating information. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) 
examined the effects of rating information on credit default swaps (CDS) and 
found that negative watchlistings contain significant information, whereas 
downgrades do not cause significant effects. It also appears that, although 
positive rating events cause significant reactions, those reactions are much less 
significant than their results for negative watchlistings. Their results also show 
that significant changes in credit default swap spreads occur as early as three 
months before the announcement date. This, however, applies only to negative 
credit rating events, including watchlistings and outlooks as well. 
 
Evidence provided by Norden and Weber (2004) confirms the results on 
pre-announcement effects by Hite and Warga (1997) and Hull et al. (2004). They 
show that the credit default swap market tends to react approximately two to 
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three months in advance of the announcement date. Furthermore, it appears 
that market reactions to negative watchlistings are larger than the effects caused 
by downgrades. Both downgrades and negative watchlistings by Moody's as 
well as negative watchlistings by Standard & Poor's cause significant spread 
changes in the credit default swap market. However, the results suggest that 
neither announcements by Fitch Ratings nor positive announcements have 
significant information content. Based on the study, the magnitude of spread 
changes depends critically on the level of prior ratings and previous rating 
events. Although it appears that the credit default swap market adjusts to new 
information in advance of the announcement date, they point out that credit 
rating information can be valuable in the long term due to its stability.  
 
Although Jorion and Zhang (2007) focus on the stock market response to rating 
events, they also emphasize the significance of prior rating similarly to Norden 
and Weber (2004). According to the paper, prior rating is “the single most 
important variable” in examining the stock market response. For example, 
taking prior rating into account causes the effects of rating changes that cross 
the border between investment grade and speculative grade to be insignificant.  
Probably due to this variable, their results suggest that upgrades also convey 
new information to the market, although the effects of positive information are 
approximately half the magnitude of negative effects. 
 
A study conducted by Hooper, Hume and Kim (2008) implies that stock price 
reactions associated with sovereign rating changes are highly significant but 
also asymmetric. The effects of sovereign rating information appear to be 
pronounced for downgrades, during crisis periods and in emerging markets. 
According to the paper, due to the importance of sovereign ratings, credit 
rating agencies have the ability to both fuel and dampen crises. Furthermore, 
especially countries with high levels of debt appear to be vulnerable to the 
effects of rating changes. 
 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) focus on the effects of sovereign rating changes 
on the credit default swap market and show that positive credit rating 
announcements cause significant market reactions. Their findings suggest that 
positive credit rating announcements cause significant credit default swap 
changes in emerging markets, while negative credit rating announcements 
appear to be insignificant rating events. In other words, the results imply that 
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only positive rating announcements convey new information to market 
participants, whereas negative changes in credit risk are already incorporated 
into spreads prior to the announcement date. These results on downgrades are 
quite similar to those reported by Hull et al. (2004). 
 
Contrary to the credit default swap market, it appears that both upgrades and 
downgrades lead to significant implications in the corporate bond market. 
According to May (2010), downgrades cause significant market responses, and 
furthermore, price reactions to downgrades are almost three times larger than 
responses to upgrades. In addition, the results of this study suggest that 
reactions for lower rated issuers are stronger than the effects for higher rated 
companies. Furthermore, it appears that credit rating changes from speculative 
grade to investment grade cause stronger price effects than upgrades in general. 
 
Vu, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2015) focus on the effects of split ratings on 
sovereign bond spreads. Consistent with the conclusions of Norden and Weber 
(2004), they find little evidence that rating events involving Fitch Ratings 
convey valuable information to market participants. According to the paper, 
divergent rating opinions by different rating agencies, also referred to as split 
ratings, give rise to ambiguity concerning the creditworthiness of a given 
sovereign entity. With respect to split ratings, higher positive events set a new 
ceiling, whereas lower negative events form a rating floor. Changes to these 
rating levels are considered important events as additional rating events are 
likely to follow. The results of the paper show that Standard & Poor's tends to 
lead the market in the case of negative credit rating events, while Moody's leads 
in the case of positive events. 
 
A study by Böninghausen and Zabel (2015) seeks to answer the question of 
whether credit rating events concerning a given nation affect other countries. It 
appears that negative spillover effects are more pronounced for countries in the 
same region. In addition, trade and other fundamental factors are found to be 
insignificant in explaining cross-border spillover effects. Furthermore, the 
results show that information asymmetry clearly also applies to spillover 
effects, since bond market reactions to positive rating events are “much more 
muted at best” than responses to downgrades. Based on their findings, it is 
likely that these spillover effects are caused not only by credit rating events but 
also by news releases. 
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Evidence provided by Baum, Schäfer and Stephan (2016) shows that, although 
the effect of rating announcements on the value of the euro is insignificant, 
credit rating events have an impact on sovereign bond yields. Based on their 
findings, it appears that downgrades have a significant effect on volatility and 
bond yields. Surprisingly, negative credit outlooks seem to cause even stronger 
market reactions than downgrades. The finding that announcements indicating 
the potential direction of rating changes cause stronger market responses than 
actual credit rating announcements is not particularly novel. However, it is 
somewhat surprising that credit outlooks, rather than watchlistings, cause the 
strongest market responses (cf. Hull et al. 2004; Norden and Weber 2004). 
 
After focusing on the effect of credit rating information on financial markets, it 
is of interest to also focus on whether economic events have affected procedures 
and methodologies used in assigning credit ratings. To answer this question, 
Reusens and Croux (2017) assessed the importance of sovereign credit rating 
determinants. Their findings show that rating methods do indeed have changed 
after the start of the European debt crisis. A comparison of rating determinants 
over the period 2002 through 2015 reveals that the importance of fiscal balance, 
economic development and external debt has increased substantially since 2009. 
Furthermore, it appears that rating agencies changed their outlook on eurozone 
membership as the membership shifted from a positive to a negative factor. 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The following chapters form the empirical part of the paper and consist of a 
brief description of the data, research methodology and empirical findings. The 
description of the data used in this study is followed by a chapter presenting 
the methods for calculating abnormal bond returns and for examining the 
information content of sovereign ratings. The purpose of this empirical part is 
to examine whether sovereign rating announcements cause asymmetric bond 
price reactions and whether rating changes crossing the border between 
investment grade and speculative grade cause significant price effects. 
Furthermore, the importance of prior rating on the magnitude of market 
responses is evaluated. 
6.1. Data Description 
The data used in this study consists of daily bond index returns and credit 
rating announcements by Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings over 
the period from January 2000 to April 2015. The bond price data consisting of 
sovereign bond indices for maturities of two and ten years is obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The indices used in this study are total return 
benchmark indices, which are based on the most representative single bonds for 
the given maturity band. In the case of simultaneous rating events, rating 
announcements are included and excluded based on the level of prior ratings, 
since there are no differences in the magnitude of simultaneous rating changes. 
In other words, only a rating change by the credit rating agency with the lowest 
or lower credit rating prior to the rating announcement is included. 
 
The following nine European countries are included in the study: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. These 
countries were selected in order to ensure an economic and geographic 
diversity as well as a sufficient number of rating events in the sample. For 
example, these countries can be divided into two groups, as Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) were considered weaker than the rest during 
the financial crisis. Geographically, the data sample consists of a central 
European country, four southern European and four western European 
countries. Since the European debt crisis and the above-mentioned countries 
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provide an intriguing setting for the study, the sample was also limited to the 
crisis period from January 2010 through December 2014. However, the results 
for the subsample proved less significant than other results; therefore, these 
results are included only in the appendices. In this case, the main problem with 
subsampling is that it decreases further the number of observations. 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns over a 
three-day event window. As shown in the table, the sharpest decline and 
positive change were approximately -23 % and 36 %, respectively. The largest 
negative change occurred after Greece failed to form a government on May 
2012, while the sharpest increase in the abnormal returns was recorded after 
finance ministers of the European Union showed political will to defend the 
single currency and agreed on a €750 billion financial aid on May 2010. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
 
2-year Mean (%) Median (%) Minimum (%) Maximum (%)  Count 
          Austria 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.83 
 
0.84 
 
3999 
Belgium 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-1.15 
 
1.56 
 
3999 
France 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.79 
 
0.55 
 
3999 
Greece -0.05 
 
0.00 
 
-20.48 
 
22.44 
 
3999 
Ireland -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.76 
 
0.62 
 
3999 
Italy 0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-1.99 
 
2.58 
 
3999 
Netherlands 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.56 
 
0.56 
 
3999 
Portugal 0.02 
 
0.00 
 
-8.23 
 
7.04 
 
3999 
Spain 0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-2.29 
 
2.23 
 
3999 
          10-year                   
         
          Austria -0.77 
 
-0.76 
 
-3.48 
 
2.22 
 
3999 
Belgium -0.76 
 
-0.76 
 
-5.51 
 
3.88 
 
3999 
France -0.77 
 
-0.77 
 
-3.49 
 
2.64 
 
3999 
Greece -0.78 
 
-0.77 
 
-23.27 
 
36.44 
 
3999 
Ireland -0.76 
 
-0.75 
 
-8.56 
 
8.73 
 
3999 
Italy -0.76 
 
-0.76 
 
-4.92 
 
6.26 
 
3999 
Netherlands -0.76 
 
-0.76 
 
-2.94 
 
2.18 
 
3999 
Portugal -0.76 
 
-0.77 
 
-13.29 
 
13.16 
 
3999 
Spain -0.76 
 
-0.77 
 
-4.46 
 
7.72 
 
3739 
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Table 3 below presents the breakdown of credit rating changes by original 
rating class. In addition, cardinal number scale representing the credit rating 
scale is included in the table. The purpose of this cardinal rating scale is 
discussed in more detail in the following section. As can be seen from the table, 
prior rating is considered investment grade in almost four-fifths of the rating 
events. As shown in Tables 4–7 in the penultimate chapter, rating events are 
mostly downgrades, since approximately one-third of the announcements are 
upgrades. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of rating changes by original rating class. 
 
 
Rating Class  
Cardinal 
Rating  
Number of 
Rating 
Changes  
Percentage 
       AAA & AA 
 
17–20 
 
49 
 
37.12 
       A 
 
14–16 
 
34 
 
25.76 
       BBB 
 
11–13 
 
22 
 
16.67 
       BB 
 
8–10 
 
5 
 
3.79 
       B 
 
5–7 
 
9 
 
6.82 
       Below B 
 
0–4 
 
13 
 
9.85 
       Total       132   100 
6.2. Research Methodology 
The methods employed to evaluate the information content of sovereign credit 
ratings are presented in this section. The research hypotheses are tested in a 
manner similar to that used by Jorion and Zhang (2007). These methods 
employed by them are similar to those used in many of the previous studies 
cited above, but they also emphasized the importance of prior rating as a 
variable. As there is no reason to omit the variable and it is essential to examine 
the role of prior rating in the sovereign bond market, the variable is included to 
test the related hypothesis. However, before moving on to these methods, it 
may be of importance to explore methods for calculating index and cumulative 
abnormal returns. The daily returns of the total return indices are calculated by 
Thomson Reuters Datastream in the following way: 
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(6)  RI" = 100 
 
  RI6 = RI6E'× (8F,%(HF,%($8F,%(IF,%)F ×JF,%KL(8F,%KL(HF,%KL($8F,%KL)F ×JF,%KL 
 
where: P = clean price of the bond based on a middle price 
 Pi,t = clean price of the ith bond at time t 
 A = accrued interest to the settlement date 
 CP = adjustment for bonds with ex-dividend periods 
 Gi,t = coupon received from the ith bond at time t 	 N = nominal value of amount outstanding 
 
The summations above are over the bonds currently in the benchmark index, 
and during ex-dividend periods for bonds that have ex-dividend periods, CP 
equals the value of the next coupon payment and zero otherwise. Now that the 
method for calculating index returns has been presented, let us briefly focus on 
the method of measuring abnormal returns. First, cumulative abnormal returns, 
denoted by CAR, are calculated for each total return index over the three-day 
announcement window. This announcement window covers the days around 
the announcement date, and announcements are released at t = 0. The market 
index is a benchmark index representing the sovereign bond market in the 
eurozone. These total return indices for maturities of two and ten years are also 
calculated by Thomson Reuters Datastream. The market-adjusted excess returns 
are calculated as follows: 
 
(7)  CARO = RO,6 − RP,6('6-E'  
 
where: Rj,t = return on bond index i at time t 
 Rm,t = return on the market index at time t 
 
Instead of using mean-adjusted returns or relying on estimated parameters and 
the OLS market model in measuring abnormal returns, excess returns are 
calculated by using the market model procedure also studied by Brown and 
Warner (1980). In their studies published in 1980 and 1985, they find no 
evidence that more sophisticated methods convey any additional benefit in 
event studies, and in addition, they state that time should be spent in 
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constructing event studies rather than on these methods. However, they argue 
that the other approaches mentioned above outperform the mean-adjusted 
procedure as it has low power in cases involving event-day clustering. 
 
The methods for calculating index and cumulative abnormal returns have now 
been presented, and it is time to move on to discuss the approach to examining 
the implications of rating announcements for the sovereign bond market. To 
test the research hypotheses, procedures similar to those employed in previous 
studies and by Jorion and Zhang (2007) are followed. The first regression allows 
the analysis of the price effects of credit rating changes, rating changes crossing 
the border between investment grade and speculative grade, and rating 
changes with prior rating below investment grade. These effects of rating 
announcements on sovereign bond returns are estimated with the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
 
(8)  CARO = α" + α'RCHGO + α?IGRADEO + αUSGRADEO + εO 
 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable, CAR, is used to measure 
cumulative abnormal returns during the announcement window. The first 
variable in the regression is RCHG and it indicates the magnitude of rating 
changes. Credit ratings are converted into cardinal numbers on a scale of 0 to 
20, with each number representing a separate rating and 20 indicating the 
highest credit quality. The effects of credit rating changes crossing the cut-off 
between investment and non-investment grade are represented by a dummy 
variable, IGRADE, which takes the value of one if rating changes cross this 
border and zero otherwise. In addition, another dummy variable, SGRADE, is 
included in the regression, and it is set to one if the prior rating is below 
investment grade.  
 
As SGRADE is the dummy variable only for credit rating changes from and 
within speculative grade, a variable for prior rating also has to be included in 
the study, since the effect of prior rating on the magnitude of market responses 
needs to be examined. To test whether the inclusion of this variable leads to 
increases in the explanatory power and whether there are other improvements 
compared to the regression model above, another regression similar to that is 
employed. In this regression model, the variable SGRADE is replaced by PRT, 
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which represents the prior rating expressed in terms of cardinal numbers. The 
regression, which can be described as an extension of the previous regression 
model, is constructed in the following manner: 
 
(9)  CARO = α" + α'PRTO + α?RCHGO + αUIGRADEO + εO 
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
After the introduction of the theoretical framework above, let us move on to the 
empirical results of the study. As stated above, the regression model with the 
variable for rating changes from and within non-investment grade is employed 
first, after which it is replaced by the variable for prior rating. Thus, the results 
and regression models can be compared. Based on previous studies, it would be 
logical to expect that downgrades cause significant price reactions, whereas 
upgrades lead to less significant effects. Furthermore, speculative-grade bonds 
are expected to be more vulnerable to rating changes than investment-grade 
bonds. In addition, it is also highly probable that rating changes crossing the 
border between investment grade and speculative grade cause significant 
reactions. The estimated coefficients from the first regression and associated 
t-statistics are reported in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. The impact of rating changes on 2-year sovereign bond returns. 
 
  All   Downgrades   Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.02 
  
-0.05 
  
-0.03 
 
 
-0.19 
  
-0.22 
  
-0.89 
 
         RCHG 0.12 ** 
 
0.06 
  
0.05 ** 
 
2.20 
  
0.41 
  
2.26 
 
         IGRADE -2.05 *** -2.51 *** 0.02 
 
 
-5.19 
  
-5.12 
  
0.17 
 
         SGRADE -0.30 
  
-0.55 * 
 
-0.06 
 
 
-1.35 
  
-1.71 
  
-1.11 
                  
         R Square (%) 21.73 
 
23.76 
 
15.98 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 19.90 
 
21.35 
 
7.29 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
<0.0001 
 
0.1622 
         Observations 132 
 
99 
 
33 
 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and *, 
respectively, while t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
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The second column in Table 4 shows that rating changes from investment grade 
to below investment grade significantly affect sovereign bond returns. These 
downgrades are associated with an abnormal average return of -2.51%, which is 
not only statistically significant but also relatively large considering that the 
sample represents sovereign bonds with a maturity of two years. In addition to 
that, the results suggest that bonds downgraded within non-investment grade 
are more prone to market responses than other bonds. At least at this point, the 
results for the small sample of upgrades are insignificant. 
 
As shown in table 5, downgrades to below investment grade cause stronger 
market reactions for bonds with a maturity of ten years compared with the 
results above. In other words, it appears that the magnitude of the market 
response increases with maturity. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the 
SGRADE coefficient is now only two basis points above the five percent 
significance level. Compared with the coefficient above, it is also twice as large. 
 
Table 5. The impact of rating changes on 10-year sovereign bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.64 *** -1.21 ** 
 
-2.26 *** 
 
-2.68 
  
-2.59 
  
-4.46 
 
         RCHG 0.61 *** 0.06 
  
1.52 *** 
 
5.27 
  
0.22 
  
4.35 
 
         IGRADE -2.84 *** -4.00 *** 1.31 
 
 
-3.36 
  
-4.31 
  
0.74 
 
         SGRADE 0.15 
  
-1.21 * 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.33 
  
-1.98 
  
0.52 
                   
         R Square (%) 25.43 
 
18.96 
 
56.03 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 23.68 
 
16.40 
 
51.48 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
0.0002 
 
<0.0001 
         Observations 132 
 
99 
 
33 
 
See Table 4 for details and definitions. 
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The results for upgrades are presented in the rightmost column of Table 5. 
Surprisingly, it now appears that positive rating announcement cause both 
statistically and economically significant market reactions. However, this may 
be due to the small sample size. Since rating agencies tend to lag behind the 
market during crises, it is also possible that only upgrades seem to convey 
valuable information to the market because the sample period includes extreme 
price fluctuations that occurred during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
In the following tables, the variable SGRADE is replaced by PRT. First of all, the 
results for positive rating announcement are insignificant in the same way as in 
Table 4. Contrary to the existing evidence regarding the stock market response, 
downgrades to below investment grade appear to cause highly significant 
market responses, although a variable for the prior rating is included in the 
regression. However, this is not surprising as downgrades appear to be 
insignificant rating events in general. 
 
Table 6. The effect of prior rating on 2-year sovereign bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.52 ** 
 
-0.83 * 
 
-0.07 
 
 
-2.17 
  
-1.72 
  
-0.81 
 
         PRT 0.03 ** 
 
0.05 * 
 
0.00 
 
 
2.00 
  
1.95 
  
0.61 
 
         RCHG 0.14 ** 
 
0.07 
  
0.05 * 
 
2.53 
  
0.48 
  
1.86 
 
         IGRADE -1.94 *** -2.27 *** -0.03 
 
 
-4.93 
  
-4.70 
  
-0.23 
                 
         R Square (%) 23.01 
 
24.44 
 
13.50 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 21.21 
 
22.05 
 
4.56 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
<0.0001 
 
0.2330 
         Observations 132 
 
99 
 
33 
 
See Table 4 for details and definitions. 
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At this point, it is fairly safe to say that rating changes from investment to 
speculative grade cause significant market responses. Furthermore, this finding 
holds almost uniformly across maturity bands and regardless of the method 
used. The results for downgrades crossing the border between investment and 
speculative grade are also consistent with previous research and often 
interpreted as evidence that institutional investors are restricted to specific 
rating categories as discussed above. 
 
Table 7 presents the results for sovereign bonds with a maturity of ten years. 
Once again, the variable for negative rating changes is insignificant. In addition, 
although a positive correlation between prior ratings and cumulative abnormal 
returns is reported, it is not sufficient to explain the role of prior ratings. 
Upgrades, on the other hand, appear to be both statistically and economically 
significant. Furthermore, market responses to upgrades appear to be more 
pronounced for bonds with longer maturities. 
 
Table 7. The effect of prior rating on 10-year sovereign bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.63 
  
-2.64 *** -2.04 * 
 
-1.21 
  
-2.86 
  
-1.70 
 
         PRT 0.00 
  
0.09 * 
 
-0.02 
 
 
0.04 
  
1.89 
  
-0.27 
 
         RCHG 0.61 *** 0.10 
  
1.56 *** 
 
5.19 
  
0.39 
  
4.22 
 
         IGRADE -2.85 *** -3.51 *** 1.64 
 
 
-3.35 
  
-3.81 
  
1.01 
                   
         R Square (%) 25.37 
 
18.68 
 
55.72 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 23.62 
 
16.11 
 
51.14 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
0.0002 
 
<0.0001 
         Observations 132 
 
99 
 
33 
 
See Table 4 for details and definitions. 
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To summarize, the empirical findings presented above support the view that 
rating changes from investment to non-investment grade cause significant 
market responses, and thus play a major role in the bond market. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that negative rating changes within speculative grade are 
associated with more pronounced price reactions than downgrades in general. 
Although downgrades appear to be insignificant rating events, findings based 
on a small sample of upgrades indicate that positive rating announcements do 
have an impact on sovereign bond returns. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the relation between credit rating announcements and 
sovereign bond returns. To be more specific, the paper analyzes whether credit 
rating changes, rating changes crossing the border between investment and 
speculative grade, and rating changes with prior rating below investment grade 
cause significant market responses in sovereign bond markets. This paper 
contributes to the literature on the role of credit rating agencies in financial 
markets, since relatively little has been said concerning the implications of 
credit rating information for the sovereign bond market. 
 
First, the results of the empirical analysis support the view that rating changes 
from investment to non-investment grade cause significant market reactions. 
Second, these results suggest that downgrades within speculative grade cause 
stronger price effects than downgrades in general, and third, findings based on 
a small sample indicate that positive rating announcements have a significant 
effect on sovereign bond returns. Surprisingly, the results show that negative 
rating announcements are insignificant events from the bondholders' point of 
view, and not surprisingly, the magnitude of market reactions appears to 
increase with maturity. 
 
Is fairly safe to say, in the light of these findings, that rating announcement 
clearly have an effect on sovereign bond prices. In the first chapter, it was 
hypothesized that only downgrades cause significant bond price reactions. 
However, the findings of this paper suggest quite the opposite, and therefore 
the first hypothesis must be rejected. On the other hand, since the result show 
that downgrades to below investment grade cause significant market responses, 
the second hypothesis must be accepted. Although it appears that negative 
rating changes within non-investment grade are associated with stronger 
market responses than downgrades in general, the third hypothesis cannot be 
accepted with certainty. 
 
The results are also in line with previous literature, since the importance of the 
border between investment and non-investment grade has been emphasized, 
and since evidence supporting the view that lower-rated bonds are associated 
with stronger market responses than bonds with higher ratings has been 
presented in previous studies. Furthermore, the findings regarding upgrades 
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are consistent with the evidence from the credit default swap market. Several 
studies have suggested investment restrictions regarding the distinction 
between investment and speculative grade as a possible explanation for the 
effects of rating changes from investment to non-investment grade. As for the 
information asymmetry between negative and positive rating announcements, 
previous studies have presented that negative watchlisting contain valuable 
information, while the information conveyed by negative rating changes is 
already incorporated into spreads prior to the announcement date. 
 
Although the empirical findings reported in this paper suggest that credit 
rating agencies occasionally lag behind the financial market, credit ratings are 
nevertheless considerably less volatile than spreads and prices. In other words, 
credit rating information is valuable in the long term due to its stability. 
Furthermore, issuers are able to provide rating agencies with information 
without publicly revealing it, and the agencies, in turn, are able to incorporate 
this privately disclosed information into their ratings. Finally, the theory on 
investment restrictions raises the question of whether regulatory constraints, 
which likely lead to suboptimal investment decisions, are rational in their 
current form. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. The impact of rating changes on 2-year bond returns. 
 
  All   Downgrades   Upgrades 
         Intercept 0.01 
  
-0.14 
  
-0.01 
 
 
0.06 
  
-0.42 
  
-0.21 
 
         RCHG 0.14 ** 
 
0.01 
  
0.05 
 
 
1.99 
  
0.05 
  
1.70 
 
         IGRADE -2.03 *** -2.53 *** 0.02 
 
 
-4.41 
  
-4.60 
  
0.13 
 
         SGRADE -0.41 
  
-0.79 * 
 
-0.08 
 
 
-1.43 
  
-1.94 
  
-1.01 
                  
         R Square (%) 21.68 
 
26.64 
 
17.21 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 19.12 
 
21.54 
 
0.65 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.4037 
         Observations 96 
 
77 
 
19 
 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and *, 
respectively, while t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients. 
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Appendix 2. The impact of rating changes on 10-year bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.40 
 
-1.01 * 
 
-2.22 ** 
 
-1.24 
  
-1.77 
  
-2.49 
 
         RCHG 0.70 *** 0.20 
  
1.58 *** 
 
5.10 
  
0.66 
  
3.26 
 
         IGRADE -2.96 *** -3.92 *** 1.41 
 
 
-3.27 
  
-4.07 
  
0.59 
 
         SGRADE 0.28 
  
-0.86 
  
0.23 
 
 
0.50 
  
-1.19 
  
0.19 
                   
         R Square (%) 31.19 
 
20.62 
 
52.62 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 28.95 
 
17.35 
 
43.15 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0091 
         Observations 96 
 
77 
 
19 
 
See Appendix 1 for details and definitions. 
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Appendix 3. The effect of prior rating on 2-year bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.66 ** 
 
-1.15 * 
 
-0.14 
 
 
-2.18 
  
-1.85 
  
-1.09 
 
         PRT 0.05 ** 
 
0.06 ** 
 
0.01 
 
 
2.07 
  
2.04 
  
1.08 
 
         RCHG 0.18 ** 
 
0.04 
  
0.06 
 
 
2.44 
  
0.22 
  
1.73 
 
         IGRADE -1.91 *** -2.21 *** -0.04 
 
 
-4.17 
  
-4.07 
  
-0.28 
                  
         R Square (%) 23.48 
 
25.05 
 
17.94 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 20.98 
 
21.97 
 
1.52 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
<0.0001 
 
0.3825 
         Observations 96 
 
77 
 
19 
 
See Appendix 1 for details and definitions. 
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Appendix 4. The effect of prior rating on 10-year bond returns. 
 
  All  
Downgrades 
 
Upgrades 
         Intercept -0.41 
  
-2.03 * -2.72 
 
 
-0.69 
  
-1.86 
  
-1.39 
 
         PRT 0.01 
  
0.06  
 
0.04 
 
 
0.18 
  
1.18 
  
0.29 
 
         RCHG 0.72 *** 0.24 
  
1.75 *** 
 
4.94 
  
0.80 
  
3.09 
 
         IGRADE -2.96 *** -3.58 *** 1.58 
 
 
-3.26 
  
-3.75 
  
0.71 
                   
         R Square (%) 31.03 
 
20.58 
 
52.78 
         Adjusted R Square (%) 28.78 
 
17.32 
 
43.34 
         Significance F <0.0001 
 
0.0007 
 
<0.0089 
         Observations 96 
 
77 
 
19 
 
See Appendix 1 for details and definitions. 
